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October 11, 1991
University of Nebraska College of Law
This Article is intended to share with you my perspective and that
of others actively involved in the ongoing negotiations of the Uruguay
Round of the GATT. I discuss the present status of the Round, and
America's post-round trade agenda.1
I. INTRODUCTION
As our world becomes ever smaller and our need to work coopera-
* Address of the Honorable David K. Karnes before the Ford Foundation/Ameri-
can Society of International Law Regional Conference held at the University of
Nebraska College of Law on October 11, 1991. Since 1989, Karnes has been Of
Counsel to Kutak Rock, Omaha, NE and Washington, D.C. He is a member of the
United States Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations. Karnes is
the President and CEO of The Fairmont Group, Inc.; a merchant banking, inter-
national trade and consulting joint venture. He served Nebraska as a United
States Senator from March 1987 until January 1989.
1. I acknowledge and thank the Ford Foundation, the American Society, the Col-
lege of Law, Professor McGeorge and the University's Center for International
Trade Policy for sponsoring the Conference.
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tively among nations and people, both politically and economically, be-
comes ever greater, opportunities to communicate, to discuss, to
educate and to understand America's trade interests are vital if
thoughtful public policy is to emerge and, more importantly, be
implemented.
On April 5th of 1991, I noted in my presentation made in conjunc-
tion with the University of Nebraska's Hendricks Symposium on
American Trade Policy in a Changed World Political Economy that
our Congress and our trade policy was then at a historic juncture.
That juncture was the debate on fast-track authority-a
Congressionally approved negotiating authority which is the corner-
stone of America's credibility in trade negotiations.
Now I see that we have moved from my "historic juncture" to an
"international trade crossroads."2 The unfortunate fact of life in most
multilateral trade negotiations--and the reason that they are so frus-
trating to so many-is that there are '"historic junctures" and "cross-
roads" somewhere, with someone, every sixty days! The great
satisfaction of accomplishing one goal-making the correct decision at
one crossroads-only assures one of another such dilemma surfacing
just around the corner.
What is the role of International Law and International Institu-
tions in the Post Uruguay Round Era? First, nothing is more impor-
tant to this Country and indeed the community of nations than the
implementation of, and adherence to, an effective, fair, enforceable
multilateral international trading regime and the laws and institutions
to support them.
Without meaningful, acceptable laws and institutions the world be-
comes a den of thieves with every man, every country, living and act-
ing only for themselves. Only short term goals would be addressed.
Indeed, the theme would be "live for today."
Thus, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), even
without the success of its vitally important Uruguay Round, is the
worlds most important trade agreement. Under GATT sponsorship
the world's trading nations have held seven successful rounds of nego-
tiations since World War II in which tariff rates have been slashed by
more than 75 percent. As a result, trade has exploded from just $60
billion in 1950 to $4 trillion in 1991. GATT and its associated laws and
institutions allowed much of this growth to happen without too much
pain, suffering and bloodshed.
What will our trading world look like if the Uruguay Round fails?
We need not look any further than what is actually happening today.
2. Testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative,
before the Committee on Ways & Means, Subcommittee on Trade, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington D.C., Oct. 8, 1991.
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One-third of the world's trade-more than $1 trillion of international
commerce a year-is not adequately covered by internationally agreed
rules. Coverage for agriculture is ineffective. Services, investment
and intellectual property are not covered at all. Let me share with
you the colorful perspective from one of the United States most suc-
cessful export sectors-entertainment products.
The first week of October 1991 at Georgetown University, a promi-
nent American and colleague of mine on the ACTPN (United States
Advisory Committee on Trade Policy & Negotiations)-Jack Valenti,3
described the effect on the motion picture industry, specifically, and
American intellectual property interests generally, of not having in-
ternational laws and institutions in place-thus no GATT coverage, as
follows:
There's a war going on at this very minute that could shatter your future.
That war is the clash of imports versus exports.
It is a global struggle removed from the headlines, disguised as 'trade nego-
tiations.' The first test will be the United States response to pressures of other
countries whose aim it is to cripple the ability of American movies, T.V. pro-
grams, books, recordings and computer software to gain entry to world
marketplaces.
The discord between the free and Communist world has petered out for
the time being. To the democracies of the West, the future is less dependent
on missiles and tanks than it is on manufacturing and services. Now the duel
begins: a brawl between national economies, a battle that feeds on the fury of
determining who will make the goods and create the services that a global
marketplace chooses to buy.
One doesn't have to read the entrails of a pig to see the signs.
The delicate irony that runs like a twanging wire through all the geo-polit-
ical summits and conferences that infest the world is that the deader the Cold
War becomes, the more will economic exertions strain the stretching limits of
political treaties and trade accords. The final triumph will come to one or a
group of countries not when their armies and air fleets have flattened the
enemy but when they march into territories under a banner on which is em-
blazoned the signature of their companies whose products dominate the malls
and the stores. Surplus balances of trade or its sour counterpart, deficit bal-
ances, will supplant body counts and bomb tonnage. Robert Mosbacher and
Carla Hills will displace Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf as com-
manders in the field. ...
In the European Community, twelve nation-states are grinding down barri-
ers that lie between them, and building barriers that separate them from the
rest of the world. In the thriving states on the rim of Asia, in Japan, the head-
waters of the most powerful global trading country in the known world, this
war is real.
The European Community now wields a gross national product equal to
ours, with a hundred million more people than inhabit the United States.
They are stringing their trade bows tight, and the smell of export conquest is
in their parliamentary nostrils. There is in Brussels and Strasbourg a lamen-
table squinting toward Fortress rather than Freedom....
3. President of the Motion Picture Association of America and former Chief of Staff
for President Johnson.
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This calamitous litany could go on and on, but who needs so many Maalox
Moments. As the T.V. commercial goes, we haven't got time for the pain....
So it is that the United States says farewell to the Communism versus the
West conflict, and buckles on its armor for the export versus import struggle.
Mark it well: No battle to preserve America's ability to compete globally is
more important than the challenges to the freedom of America's creative in-
dustries to move unhobbled around the world.4
Valenti presents the picture graphically. Indeed, it is not a pretty
picture. But do not lose faith. The Round is not over. What is today's
status of the Round?
H. STATUS OF THE ROUND
Status reports of the Uruguay Round include multiple statements
of concern, hedged confidence and international finger pointing. First,
from the institution itself, the GATT and Director-General Arthur
Dunkel.
On September 20, 1991, Mr. Dunkel noted that plans are under way
to prepare a new draft agreement of Round concessions that would
include the political and technical decisions needed to bring the nego-
tiations to a conclusion. However, even if this final agreement for all
seven negotiating groups is struck, several months' worth of work re-
main in order to complete detailed concessions on market access for
goods, services and GATT institutional issues. Further draft negotiat-
ing texts must be put together in at least four areas where no accepted
texts currently exist-agriculture, anti-dumping, trade-related invest-
ment measures and balance-of-payment measures. In sum, Mr.
Dunkel admitted that key trading partners must decide whether they
have the political will to conclude the negotiations because he will not
allow them to drag on.
As a result of this Dunkel statement the Cairns Group of agricul-
tural exporters expressed concerns whether the Director-General has
the capacity to achieve the difficult compromises required of the key
negotiating nations or if he will increasingly push the status quo posi-
tions held by the EC and Japan.
United States Trade Ambassador Carla Hills advised our ACTPN
group earlier5 this week that Round negotiations can be concluded
early in 1992 provided negotiations in agriculture begin in earnest in
December. A big proviso, if Round history is considered.
Hills welcomed Dunkel's draft final agreements, yet acknowledged
that the real issue remaining is the willingness of the EC to actually
4. Speech by Mr. Valenti, "The New Trade Religion: Culture and Quotas" at Ge-
orgetown University Center for German and European Studies and the Karl F.
Landegger Program in International Business Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., Oct.
2, 1991.
5. Oct. 9, 1991.
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negotiate. She added "we have not had to-date even one day of polit-
ical negotiations in agriculture."6
Once the agricultural negotiations are unblocked it will take four
to six months to conclude the Uruguay Round simply because the
stalemate has delayed work in other areas. In the market access
group, one-third of the 9,000 tariff items under discussion are agricul-
tural. Thus, it is very difficult to negotiate agreements in other areas
when many countries have established their principal negotiating pri-
ority as market access for their agricultural goods. A large group of
GATT members, therefore, are unwilling to compromise elsewhere
pending a clear understanding of their agricultural access issues. Ob-
viously, this presents a troubling "chicken or egg" situation. Then, of
course, there is the EC view-consistently confusing.
EC Commissioner Frans Andriessen said in early October, 1991,
that expectations for agricultural reform are too high in the short
term. As a result, he concluded, insufficient offers have been made in
other areas which prevent a package deal. Moving ahead in four or
five key sectors is the only reasonable way the EC can meet demands
in agriculture, he stated.
On the other hand, EC Commissioner Leon Britton told a Wash-
ington, D.C., audience on September 23, 1991, that the time has come
for the EC to specify more precisely the details of an informal offer
EC Agriculture Commissioner Ray MacSharry made at the 1991 EC
ministerial meeting. That offer indicated a willingness of the EC to
consider restrictions on the volume of its subsidized exports and allow
market access of three percent for goods whose access fell below that
level. It also would have dropped plans to restrict imports of soybeans
and feed grains. The EC attached a number of conditions to that offer,
which trading partners rejected as insufficient, by insisting on
rebalancing concessions for corn gluten feed and other non-grain feed
ingredients. In addition, the EC wanted a commitment that the
"mechanisms" from the Uruguay Round negotiations would be consid-
ered "compatible with GATT."7 This would have ruled out dispute
settlement panels, leaving only monitoring or consultations as a fol-
low-up. In essence a "gutting" of the enforceability provisions deemed
key by the United States.
Are those words of encouragement? Or are we indeed "reading the
entrails of a pig?"8 Only time and patience will tell.
6. Inside U.S. Trade: Special Report, Sept. 27, 1991, page S-1.
7. Inside U.S. Trade: Special Report, Sept. 27, 1991, page S-2.
8. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Speech by Mr. Valenti, "The New
Trade Religion: Culture and Quotas" at Georgetown University Center for Ger-
man and European Studies and the Karl F. Landegger Program in International
Business Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., Oct. 2, 1991.
[Vol. 71:438
CROSSROADS
III. UNITED STATES POST ROUND TRADE AGENDA
But let us assume no successful Uruguay Round completion. What
will the United States do?
First, we must remember the three-prong trade strategy of the
Bush Administration announced in February of 1989: (1) to achieve a
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of global trade talks;
(2) to launch individual and hemispheric market-opening negotiations
with our key trading partners, and; (3) to leverage the power of our
domestic demand to create market openings throughout the world.
That said, let me assure you that if the Uruguay Round falters our
trade policy will remain strong. We will continue to press for open
markets in every forum available to us.
A. The North American Free Trade Agreement
Late in September, 1991, Ambassador Hills and her counterparts in
Canada and Mexico met for the third time to continue negotiations for
a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Together we
could create the largest, richest market in the world with 360 million
consumers and $6 trillion in annual output.
Already the United States has seen the benefits of liberalizing
trade with Mexico. Since 1986, when Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and reduced its tariff protections
from 100 percent to roughly ten percent, United States exports to
Mexico have more than doubled, rising from $12.4 billion to an annual-
ized rate of $28.4 billion in 1990.9
The doubling of United States exports created 320,000 United
States jobs. Each additional $1 billion of United States exports will
mean 19,000 new United States jobs.1O
All sectors of the United States economy have benefited from this
market opening: exports of automobiles and auto parts have quadru-
pled; exports of corn have tripled; and exports of telecommunications
equipment have doubled. Exports of iron and steel, that were running
a $12 million deficit four years ago, now are tallying a $300 million
surplus. Just four years ago we had a $91 million deficit in textiles and
apparel trade with Mexico." Today, we are running a surplus.
Mexico is our fastest growing export opportunity. United States
9. Testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative,
before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., Mar.
14, 1991.
10. I&
11. Testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative,
before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitive-
ness, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C., Mar. 20, 1991.
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sales to Mexico are double those to either Korea or Taiwan, three
times those to Hong Kong, four times those to China, and five times
those to Brazil.12 Indeed, our exports to Mexico have grown twice as
fast as compared with our exports to the rest of the world. Mexico
buys a full thirty-five percent more from the United States per person
than does the far more affluent European Community.
A free trade agreement would not only lock in these gains, but also
create new openings for United States industry. The NAFTA will im-
prove access for United States exports to a market which is expected
to have 100 million Mexican consumers by the year 2000.
Despite independent economic analysis and anecdotal evidence,
some are concerned that more open trade with Mexico will hurt
United States workers. However, all the economic studies show that
total United States exports will increase by as much as Mexican trade
barriers decrease. And, as illustrated below, these exports will help
generate jobs in the United States-particularly in higher-wage,
higher-technology industries.
The experience of the last decade lends credence to this assertion.
During the 1980s, United States firms set up factories in Mexico at a
record pace under the maquiladora program.1 3 As a result, thousands
of jobs were created and retained on the United States side of the bor-
der to support those facilities, according to studies by the Office of the
United States Trade Representative. 14
A free trade agreement also could save United States jobs by en-
abling our companies to remain competitive in relation to Asian and
European firms. Often, the alternative to production in Mexico under
a free trade agreement is not continued production in the United
States, but rather to move operations to East Asia. Keeping produc-
tion in Mexico will not only save many United States jobs, but also
generate new ones as Mexico spends $.70 of every trade dollar on
United States goods.
The availability of Mexico as a factory site currently has a positive
effect on United States employment. For example, Kendall Co., a
Massachusetts-based medical equipment maker, says that the Mexican
maquiladora program helps it compete effectively in certain segments
12. Id-
13. The maquiladora program is a special set of significantly reduced tariff, trade and
market access provisions agreed to between the U.S. and Mexico to encourage
economic growth and job creation in certain parts of Mexico that border the
United States. This program has created thousands of new jobs in Mexico and
considerable U.S. business investment and factory/assembly enterprises owned
by Americans in eligible Mexican locations. The jobs created are generally of
very low pay scale compared to U.S. pay structure.
14. Testimony of Ambassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative,
before the Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Wash-
ington, D.C., Mar. 12, 1991.
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of the health-care market. Without the availability of Mexican produc-
tion, approximately 3,000 Kendall jobs that exist within the United
States would have been in jeopardy.
B. The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
The North American Free Trade Agreement can be seen as the
model for others to come. The NAFTA is the first step in the creation
of President Bush's vision of a hemispheric free trade area-the ulti-
mate objective of our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI).
Just a year after President Bush announced the EAI, we have made
remarkable progress toward the implementation of the President's vi-
sion, as illustrated below.
The United States has signed individual framework agreements
with 11 Latin American nations: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Vene-
zuela. These agreements contain declarations of trade and investment
principles, commitments to consult on a regular basis, and initial agen-
das for our consultations.
In June of 1991, we signed a similar framework agreement with the
countries forming the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)-
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. This framework agree-
ment on trade and investment is the first between the United States
and a group of Latin American nations joined together for the purpose
of expanded trade. In July of 1991, we signed a framework agreement
with the thirteen English-speaking nations of the Caribbean Common
Market.
A few years ago, such cooperation between the United States and
its neighbors in Latin America would have been impossible. Historic
distrust of Washington fostered by years of American military inter-
vention in Latin America, aggressive United States efforts to force
Latin countries to restructure their debt and overhaul their central-
ized economies, and unstable Latin political leadership only recently
have changed sufficiently to allow meaningful negotiations to com-
mence. Thus, these framework agreements demonstrate an extraordi-
nary convergence of our hemispheric philosophies and purpose.
Throughout Latin America there is a bold new spirit of freedom and
free markets.
C. Regionalism versus Multilateralism
Some view the United States' efforts in the Western Hemisphere
as a retreat from the multilateral trading system, which has served us
well for over forty years. This is a mistaken perception. Our interest
is to build bridges, not barriers, to world markets. We are encouraging
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:438
the integration of the world's trading nations, not its break-up into
competing blocks.
Regional efforts to lower trade barriers tear the fabric of the world
trading system only if they result in new barriers to the rest of the
world. Our efforts in Mexico, Latin America, and elsewhere, augment
our broader global efforts to open markets and expand trade. Far
from raising new barriers to the outside, they will foster economic
growth in these countries and create new market opportunities for all.
We wish to grow rich with our neighbors, but not at the cost of closing
the door to other markets.
Bilateral and regional market-opening initiatives are important to
both the United States and the EC. However, if we want our econo-
mies to be energized by expanded trade, regional measures must not
substitute for multilateral negotiations, but should complement them.
And in each of these hemispheric negotiations the principles of the
Uruguay Round provide the basis for framework agreements.
D. Other Trade Initiatives
Meanwhile, we are continuing the successful and profitable imple-
mentation of the free-trade arrangement with our largest trading
partner, Canada. This has been a great boost to the New England
economy.15
15. Canada
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFrA), which took effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1989, is a historic undertaking offering significant benefits and opportuni-
ties to both parties. Canada has long been the United States' largest trading
partner, and the CFTA creates the world's largest and most comprehensive bilat-
eral free trade area.
Under the CFTA, trade and investment have increased, and competitiveness
has improved. Total merchandise trade grew from $131 billion in 1987 to $175
billion in 1990, or 33.6 percent. Due to recession in both countries, merchandise
trade for the first three-quarters of 1991 was at the same level as that in the
comparable period in 1990, or $131 billion.
Trade in services grew from a bilateral total of $14.8 billion in 1987 to $20.2
billion in 1990 or 36.5 percent. U.S. direct investment in Canada also grew from
$57 billion in 1987 to $71 billion in 1990, a 24.6 percent increase. Canadian invest-
ment in the U.S. increased 50 percent during the 1987 to 1990 period, from $22
billion to $33 billion.
The CFTA demonstrates it is both possible and profitable for countries to lib-
eralize trade in many areas. Over time it should stimulate growth, boost incomes
and increase the competitiveness of firms in both nations. Implementation of the
CBFTA has proceeded smoothly during its first three years. Canada and the
United States enacted and have put into effect broad implementing legislation
and regulations necessary to meet the obligations of the CFTA. Traders and in-
vestors on both sides of the border have moved to take advantage of the many
opportunities opened by the progressive reduction and elimination of trade and
investment barriers. Tariffs on industrial and agricultural products have been
progressively reduced according to the agreed upon phase-out schedule. Barriers
or restrictive practices in the areas of agricultural trade investment, financial
CROSSROADS
We are negotiating throughout East Asia to secure market open-
ings and the protection of our patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
In Japan, we are advancing our Structural Impediments Initiative
(SII)16 and seeking greater market opportunities for our lawyers, con-
services, energy trade and cable retransmission have been reduced or liberalized.
The outlook is for further growth as the staged removal of impediments contin-
ues during the 10-year phase-in period.
One of the most acclaimed successes of the CFTA is the accelerated elimina-
tion of tariffs, accomplished at the initiative of the private sector and with the
concurrence of Congress. The first two rounds of accelerated tariff elimination
have produced agreements covering over 650 products valued at almost $8 billion.
The Administration initiated late in 1991 a third round of this trade liberalizing
exercise widely supported on beth sides of the border.
The elimination of tariffs and most other trade barriers between the United
States and Canada is not only good for beth economies, but also for international
trade liberalization in general. The CFTA's successful implementation has pro-
vided an example for multilateral as well as other bilateral trade negotiations,
most especially, the current negotiations to conclude a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
16. Japan, the Pacific Rim and Asia
Japan: Continuing to expand access to the world's second largest industrial
economy remains a top Administration priority, as evidenced by the President
Bush's January 1992 trip to Japan.
U.S. trade policy with Japan will continue on four tracks. First, in 1992 we
will seek a market-opening agreement for paper products (a $65 billion market).
We look forward to antitrust investigations being conducted in the paper, flat
glass, autos and auto parts sectors as well. In each sector, U.S. products have
proven their international competitiveness, yet barriers and collusive practices in
the Japanese market have impeded or precluded U.S. companies from making
sales.
These negotiations will complement other sectoral agreements negotiated
under President Bush, including agreements on cellular telephones, third party
radio, wood products, and, most recently, the agreement on government procure-
ment of computers. These agreements have already resulted in millions of dol-
lars in new sales.
Second, we will build upon the commitments made by Prime Minister
Miyazawa to President Bush to strengthen and expand the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative (SH). SIT provides a systemic approach to opening the Japanese
market. It has already resulted in better resources for Japan's Fair Trade Com-
mission to enforce Japan's anti-monopoly laws, led to the repeal of the barriers
which prevented Toys R Us and other large retailers from establishing a presence
in Japan, and created more openings for private foreign investors.
Third, we will continue to press for better access to the Japanese market
through the Uruguay Round. We are urging Japan to participate in our tariff
elimination proposals for non-ferrous metals and wood products, for instance, and
are seeking improved access to financial and legal services through the services
market access negotiations. The Uruguary Round draft Final Act also contains
important provisions for U.S. interests, including giving the audio-visual copy-
right owners the right to control rental of their sound recordings and films.
Finally, we will work with the Government of Japan as it seeks to open up
Japan's closed corporate markets. For years the Japanese Government impeded
imports and discouraged partnerships between Japanese companies and foreign
suppliers. Now the Japanese Government must provide leadership to break some
1992]
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tractors, engineers, and entrepreneurs of all description. In addition,
we are working hard to expand trade initiatives with Eastern Europe
that will better integrate those countries into the world trading
system. 17
of these ingrained habits and practices. Its new "Global Business Parnership"
initiative, for instance, has coaxed concrete commitments from 23 large Japanese
companies to increase their imports by $10 billion by 1993. This approach comple-
ments the commitments the President received from the Japanese auto industry
to expand their purchases of foreign autos and parts by $10 billion over the next
three years.
China: In 1991 the U.S. initiated two section 301 actions against the People's
Republic of China-one on deficient protection of copyrights, patents, and other
intellectual property rights (IPR), and the other on market access barriers, in-
cluding high tariffs, quotas, and non-transparent regulations. The intellectual
property rights negotiations were resovled favorably on January 17, 1992, when
we signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Chinese Govern-
ment. This agreement, once implemented and enforced, will improve patent,
copyright and trade secret protection in China, as well as enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights. The U.S. pharmaceutical, computer software and entertain-
ment industries in particular will benefit from this agreement.
The market access negotiation must conclude no later than October 10, 1992.
While the Chinese Government has made progress to eliminate some barriers,
including lowering tariffs on a small class of goods and publishing some of its
trade laws, serious problems remain to be resolved. There are still very high tar-
iffs on a wide range of U.S. goods, import licensing and quotas are still in effect,
U.S. goods continue to face discriminatory standards, and the Chinese system
lacks transparency in the promulgation and application of trade laws and regula-
tions. All of these factors must be addressed to successfully resolve the investiga-
tion.
In addition to these section 301 investigations, the Customs Service and USTR
will continue to investigate and take action to curtail textile fraud, and together
with other agencies will seek to address the issue of goods made with prison la-
bor. We will continue to work with our trading partners to examine China's re-
quest for entry into the GATT.
Asia/Pacifw. The Bush Administration's trade agenda with the Asia and Pa-
cific region has two objectives: (1) to increase market access for exports of U.S.
goods and services; and (2) to encourage countries of the region to adhere to mul-
tilateral trade rules and disciplines in the day-to-day implementation of their
trade policies and practices.
For a successful Uruguay Round, we need the active participation of Korea
and the six nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Singapore--espe-
cially in the market access negotiations. We place a high priority on achieving
our tariff elimination proposals with ASEAN, and to gaining greater access to
their services markets, especially in financial services.
Our longer term goals include: Korean membership in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Taiwan's participaiton in the
GATT, graduation of ASEAN countries from developing county status, and crea-
tion of a regional organization that can serve as a vehicle for improved economic
cooperation in the Pacific Rim, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) process.
17. Central and Eastern Europe
We will continue efforts to assist the emerging democracies in central and
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We will continue to work at and through established international
economic organizations like the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development and the G-7 (the group that comprises the lead-
ers of the world's seven largest industrial democracies) to achieve
their stated purposes of the implementation of multilateral trading
agreements like the Uruguay Round.is And we continue to enforce
our trade laws as evidenced by the invoking of Section 301 of the 1974
Trade Act on Thursday the 10th19 against China by Ambassador Hills
eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by expanding mutual trading oppor-
tunities. The President announced a Trade Enhancement Initiative on March 30,
1991. One of its steps is to consider how to grant tariff-free treatment to more of
these nations' exports under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). That
review will be completed and announced in April of 1992. Our goal is to bring
these nations into the open global trading system and to promote growth through
trade.
18. OECD
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is the
primary forum for the discussion of common economic and social issues con-
fronting the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand. It was founded in 1960 as the successor to the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation which oversaw European participation in the Mar-
shall Plan.
The OECD's fundamental objective is "to achieve the highest sustainable eco-
nomic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member coun-
tries while maintaining financial stability and thus to contribute to world
economy." This objective is pursued through in-depth analysis of economic
problems confronting the developed market economies and the development of
cooperative solutions to many of these problems.
Common analysis of issues in the OECD often is instrumental in forging a
consensus among OECD countries to pursue certain negotiating goals in other
international fora such as the GATT. Work in the OECD, for example, was in-
strumental in framing a number of key negotiating issues in the Uruguay
Round-in particular the relatively new issues of trade in services, Trade Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), Trade Related Intellectual Property rights
(TRIPs) and agriculture.
19. Section 301 is an effective trade law tool to enforce U.S. rights under bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements. Section 301 may also be used to respond to unrea-
sonable, unjustifiable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that bur-
den or restrict U.S. commerce. For example, section 301 may be used to increase
opportunities for exporting U.S. goods and services, provide more equitable con-
ditions for U.S. investment abroad, and obtain more effective protection world-
wide for U.S. intellectual property.
Under section 301, private parties may petition USTR to investigate a foreign
government policy or practice and take action. USTR may also initiate such in-
vestigations on its own. In 1991 USTR initiated two investigations in response to
industry petitions, and self-initiated four investigations. In addition to these six
investigations, USTR continued consultations or other activities on two other in-
vestigations initiated prior to 1991, and monitored foreign government compli-
ance with trade agreements or other commitments that were the subject of
previous investigations.
Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "1988 Trade Act"), the USTR must identify
those countries that deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual prop-
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demanding therein the removal of Chinese trade barriers to United
States goods.
IV. CONCLUSION
But even as we work to open global markets with or without a suc-
cessful Round conclusion, we must be on guard. The political desire to
open markets-and to keep them open-is always under attack.
There are those in this country and abroad who think that they can
solve their problems by building barriers to trade. History has shown
them to be dead wrong. The record of GATT has proven them wrong.
"Protection," says Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, "is a really
good label for a very bad cause."20 Protectionism hurts people. It
erty rights or deny fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intel-
lectual property protection. Such countries that have the most onerous or
egregious acts, policies or practices and whose acts, policies or practices have the
greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products must
be designated as priority foreign countries.
Priority foreign countries are potentially subject to initiation of an investiga-
tion under section 301 conducted on an accelerated time frame. USTR may not
designate a country as a priority foreign country if it is entering into good faith
negotiations, or making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotia-
tions to provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.
USTR must consider designation of countries each year and issue a decision
within 30 days after issuance of the National Trade Estimate (NTE) report. In
addition, USTR may designate a trading partner as a priority foreign country or
remove such designation at any time the factual circumstances warrant such ac-
tion.
USTR has also created the "priority watch list" and "watch list" under "spe-
cial 301." Placement of a trading partner on the "priority watch list" or "Watch
list" indicates that particular problems exist with respect to the protection or en-
forcement of intellectual property rights or market access for persons relying on
intellectual property. Countries placed on the "priority watch list" are the focus
of increased bilateral attention on the problem areas.
On April 26, 1991 USTR identified India, Thailand and the People's Republic
of China (PRC) as priority foreign countries. On May 26, 1991, the USTR initi-
ated section 301 investigations of the acts, policies and practices of the Govern-
ment of India relating to the protection of intellectual property and market
access for audio-visual works (301-85) and on October 10, 1991 the acts, policies
and practices of the PRC concerning the protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights (301-86). On November 26, 1991 USTR extended the dead-
line for completing these investigations because of the complex and complicated
issues involved.
On January 17,1992 the United States and the PRC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding that provided the basis for terminating the section 301 investiga-
tion and revoking the PRC's identification as a priority foreign country. Under
this agreement, the PRC will make significant improvements in the protection
provided to patents, copyrights and trade secrets. The PRC has also agreed to
provide effective enforcement procedures and remedies against infringement of
all intellectual property rights.
20. 1991 United States Trade Policy Agenda and 1990 Annual Report of The President
of the United States, page 2, United States Government Printing Office.
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stifles innovation, insulates them from the marketplace, and robs
them of opportunities and choices. The people, the consumers of our
country and the world, must recognize this fact.
Choice is the indelible link between a democratic political system
and a free economic system. Everyone should have the ability to
choose how, when and where to buy and sell goods and services freely
in a fair market operating under full and fair international laws.
In a post Uruguay Round world-a world pushed into rapid change
in order to respond to people of the world, particularly in Eastern Eu-
rope and the Soviet Union-trade access to goods and services is essen-
tial. The role of international law and institutions involving trade
must continue to grow stronger with or without a fully successful con-
clusion to the Uruguay Round. I believe the Round will be ultimately
successful.
If the world trading leaders chose to act on the basis of what I be-
lieve they all know: (1) that trade and international commerce
should indeed be used as a tool of world progress and peace rather
than a selfish weapon of destruction, and; (2) that such can only be
achieved by international laws and institutions; we may well see the
Robert Mossbachers and Carla Hills2l of this country replace Colin
Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf2 2 as the most important com-
manders in the field. Then we will truly see a peace dividend of im-
measurable proportions.
21. Robert A. Mossbacher, Secretary, United States Department of Commerce; Am-
bassador Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative.
22. General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Depart-
ment of Defense. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, United States Army, Com-
mander in Chief, United States Central Command.
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APPENDIX I
GATT Summary on Agriculture Negotiations
20 September 1991
URUGUAY ROUND: NEGOTATING GROUP ON AGRICULTURE
Meeting of Friday, 20 September 1991
Chairman's Report on Informal Discussions
1. When I last reported to this Group on 26 July, I announced that I
would circulate a number of addenda to the Options Paper (document
MTW.GNG/AG/W/1) to help in intensifying participants' exploration
of the options. You have all subsequently received these addenda,
which were issued on 2 August as AG/W/1/Add.1-11. I would draw
your attention to the covering note which points out that, like the
Note on Options to which they refer, these addenda are issued on the
Chairman's own responsibility, are not exhaustive and are without
prejudice to participants' positions on these other issues which may
also need to be considered further.
2. During this week I have resumed my informal consultations on
the three areas of domestic support, market access and export compe-
tition, taking into account the Options paper and the addenda, while
moving on to consider some of the other issues which also need to be
addressed as part of the agriculture package.
3. In the area of domestic support, my consultations this week have
centered on the option of defining the "Green Box" (policies to be ex-
empt from reduction) and in particular on the criteria which might be
established to govern eligibility for this exemption. Following my ear-
lier consultations, AG/W/1/Add.3 set out some possible general crite-
ria and explored more specific provisions relating to policies of the
government service type. This week I have also discussed the criteria
which could apply to certain direct payments to producers which
might be considered "green".
4. As with government services, defining green direct payments
might involve a combination of generally-applicable and policy-spe-
cific criteria. This approach seems to be widely supported as a modal-
ity for further development, but participants have nonetheless noted
that, on the one hand, we should avoid excessive complication and, on
the other, ensure sufficient precision in the criteria which are finally
agreed to help avoid, and where unavoidable guide any future dispute
settlement processes.
5. Direct payments, whose potential effect on production and trade is
generally a greater concern than that of government services, is an
area where this balance will not be easy to strike. It involves issues
such as: the degree of decoupling of support from production to be
required, and how this might be ensured; and to what extent and
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under what additional conditions payments related to production fac-
tors may be considered "green." Specific points on which views re-
main divergent include whether or not to require quantitative limits
on any "green" direct payments, or degressive rates of support past
some threshold.
6. There is substantial work still to be done on these and other ques-
tions, and I am encouraged that it is proceeding along clear and con-
structive lines. I have noted, however, that for a number of
participants the final composition of the "Green Box" is a political de-
cision which cannot be made in isolation from the nature of the com-
mitments to be undertaken concerning "amber" support as well as in
the areas of market access and export competition.
7. My consultations on market access concerned principally Article
XI:2, market access related aspects of non-trade concerns, and the
question of a special safeguard in the context of tariffication.
8. The discussion on Article XI:2 revolved principally around Article
XI:2(c)1. It was at this stage inconclusive, with strongly held positions
apparent for both elimination of the sub-Article and for its clarifica-
tion. Again, the issue is largely of a political nature, and may be only
judged once the overall package of agriculture has sharper contours.
9. Under the general heading of non-trade concerns, food security
was often cited, in addition to concerns such as environmental issues,
the maintenance of rural economies or regional development. Despite
useful discussions during the week, there is no one view of what rele-
vant non-trade concerns are and, more importantly, there is no agree-
ment that the market access area is the most appropriate area to take
them into account.
10. I should note in this connection that many participants regarded
the consultations on the "green box" as an appropriate means to take
account of many of the non-trade concerns that have been raised.
Moreover, with particular reference to food security, many partici-
pants believed that the removal of Article XI:2(a)-the exemption
from the prohibition of export restrictions under certain conditions-
would reduce concerns about food security. No arguments were
presented for its retention although, of course, the question remains
open. The decisions outstanding in this area are, I believe, largely
political in nature and little further progress can be made before
greater precision is apparent in the modalities of the reform package.
11. I also gained from some participants preliminary views concern-
ing a special agricultural safeguard mechanism in the context of tarif-
fication. The scope and duration of such a safeguard remains open,
but progress was made on a number of issues which may be relevant
regarding the form and the modalities of applications of such safe-
guard. Those consulted tended to agree that both a price-based and
quantity-based trigger would be appropriate and useful comments
were made on the form such triggers could take.
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12. As regards export competition, this week's informal consultations
were concentrated mainly on the policy coverage of reduction commit-
ments, using as a basis for further consideration the draft generic cri-
teria and listing of export subsidy practices contained in MTN.GNG/
AG/W/1/Addendum 10. Producer financed export subsidies and sub-
sidies on agricultural primary products incorporated in exported prod-
ucts were also considered, along with some of the other matters that
are mentioned in the Add.10 list, such as bona fide food aid and export
sales from government-owned stocks.
13. Overall, the work undertaken on export competition this week
has been useful. The fact that participants are increasingly focusing
their attention and comments on the inter-linkages between specific
commitments in this and the other main areas is evidence, as I see it,
that a start is being made in really going into depth in this area.
14. This will not be easy. Compared to market access and domestic
support, discussions on export competition, for example on the defini-
tion of policy coverage or on the modalities of reduction commitments,
just to mention some of the key issues, are less advanced.
15. Clearly, as a number of participants have reiterated, there are
fundamental political issues that will have to be resolved (what is to
be reduced, what is to be disciplined, and how) before it will be possi-
ble to get to grips with many of the technical points involved. At the
same time my own feeling is that the key political issues have to be
presented for political consideration and decision against the back-
ground, or within the framework, of what I have called a solid work-
ing hypothesis in the area of export competition which takes account
of the inter-linkages and maps out the general direction in which we
might move.
16. I might add that the inter-linkages raised relate not only to equiv-
alence of commitments as between one category of measures and an-
other as they may affect export competition, but also more broadly to
equivalence and balance in terms of an overall package and the frame-
work of rules that would govern agricultural export competition in
the longer term.
17. This is where our efforts should be directed in the coming
weeks-not only in the consultations I shall be organizing-but also in
capitals and in your own bilateral consultations.
18. I observed in July that we were reaching a point where the issues
were becoming as much political as technical. It is clear from my pres-
entation today that we have indeed reached that point. While there is
still useful technical work that can be done and is being done, some
significant political decisions on the modalities for substantive negotia-
tion must be taken soon. Our work over the last six months has
helped to make it clear what these decisions concern, and what are
some of the options available. I will be continuing my informal con-
sultations in the week of I October and again in the week of 16 Octo-
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ber, in order to maintain and intensify a process which I trust will
contribute to a prompt and appropriate resolution of the outstanding
questions.
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APPENDIX II
London Economic Summit 1991
Economic Declaration
Building World Partnership
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the seven major indus-
trial democracies and the representatives of the European Commu-
nity, met in London for our seventeenth annual Summit.
2. The spread of freedom and democracy which we celebrated at
Houston has gathered pace over the last year. Together the interna-
tional community has overcome a major threat to world peace in the
Gulf. But new challenges and new opportunities confront us.
3. We seek to build world partnership, based on common values, and
to strengthen the international order. Our aim is to underpin democ-
racy, human rights, the rule of law and sound economic management,
which together provide the key to prosperity. To achieve this aim, we
will promote a truly multilateral system, which is secure and adapta-
ble and in which responsibility is shared widely and equitably. Cen-
tral to our aim is the need for a stronger, more effective UN system,
and for greater attention to the proliferation and transfer of weapons.
Economic policy
4. Over the last year, some of our economies have maintained good
growth, while most have slowed down and some gone into recession.
But a global recession has been avoided. The uncertainty created by
the Gulf crisis is behind us. We welcome the fact that there are now
increasing signs of economic recovery. Progress has been made too in
reducing the largest trade and current account imbalances.
5. Our shared objectives are a sustained recovery and price stability.
To this end, we are determined to maintain, including through our
economic policy coordination process, the medium-term strategy en-
dorsed by earlier Summits. This strategy has contained inflationary
expectations and created the conditions for sustainable growth and
new jobs.
6. We therefore commit ourselves to implement fiscal and monetary
policies, which, while reflecting the different situations in our coun-
tries, provide the basis for lower real interest rates. In this connec-
tion, continued progress in reducing budget deficits is essential. This,
together with the efforts being made to reduce impediments to private
saving, will help generate the increase in global savings needed to
meet demands for investment. We also welcome the close cooperation
on exchange markets and the work to improve the functioning of the
international monetary system.
7. We will also, with the help of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and other institutions, pursue re-
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forms to improve economic efficiency and thus the potential for
growth. These include:
a) greater competition in our economies, including regulatory reform. This
can enhance consumer choice, reduce prices and ease burdens on business.
b) greater transparency, elimination or enhanced discipline in subsidies that
have distorting effects, since such subsidies lead to inefficient allocation of re-
sources and inflate public expenditure.
c) improved education and training, to enhance the skills and improve the
opportunities of those both in and out of employment, as well as polices con-
tributing to greater flexibility in the employment system.
d) a more efficient public sector, for example through higher standards of
management and including possibilities for privatization and contracting out.
e) the wide and rapid diffusion of advances in science and technology.
f) essential investment, both private and public, in infrastructure.
8. We will encourage work nationally and internationally to develop
cost-effective economic instruments for protecting the environment,
such as taxes, charges and tradeable permits.
International trade
9. No issue has more far-reaching implications for the future pros-
pects of the world economy than the successful conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round. It will stimulate non-inflationary growth by bolstering
confidence, reversing protectionism and increasing trade flows. It will
be essential to encourage the integration of developing countries and
Central and Eastern European nations into the multilateral trading
system. All these benefits will be lost if we cannot conclude the
Round.
10. We therefore commit ourselves to an ambitious, global and bal-
anced package of results from the Round, with the widest possible par-
ticipation by both developed and developing countries. The aim of all
contracting parties should be to complete the Round before the end of
1991. We shall each remain personally involved in this process, ready
to intervene with one another if differences can only be resolved at
the highest level.
11. To achieve our objectives, sustained progress will be needed in
the negotiations at Geneva in all areas over the rest of this year. The
principal requirement is to move forward urgently in the following
areas taken together:
a) market access, where it is necessary, in particular, to cut tariff peaks for
some products while moving to zero tariffs for others, as part of a substantial
reduction of tariffs and parallel action against non-tariff barriers.
b) agriculture, where a framework must be decided upon to provide for spe-
cific binding commitments in domestic support, market access and export
competition, so that substantial progressive reductions of support and protec-
tion may be agreed in each area, taking into account non-trade concerns.
c) services, where accord on a general agreement on trade in services should
be reinforced by substantial and binding initial commitments to reduce or re-
move existing restrictions on services trade and not to impose new ones.
d) intellectual property, where clear and enforceable rules and obligations to
protect all property rights are necessary to encourage investment and the
spread of technology.
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12. Progress on these issues will encourage final agreement in areas
already close to conclusion, such as textiles, tropical products, safe-
guards and dispute settlement. Agreement to an improved dispute
settlement mechanism should lead to a commitment to operate only
under the multilateral rules. Taken all together, these and the other
elements of the negotiations, including GATT rule-making, should
amount to the substantial, wide-ranging package which we seek.
13. We will seek to ensure that regional integration is compatible
with the multilateral trading system.
14. As we noted at Houston, a successful outcome of the Uruguay
Round will also call for the institutional reinforcement of the multi-
lateral trading system. The concept of an international trade organi-
zation should be addressed in this context.
15. Open markets help to created the resources needed to protect the
environment. We therefore commend the OECD's pioneering work in
ensuring that trade and environment policies are mutually supporting.
We look to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to
define how trade measures can properly be used for environmental
purposes.
16. We are convinced the OECD members must overcome in the
near future and, in any case, by the end of the year, remaining obsta-
cles to an agreement on reducing the distortions that result from the
use of subsidized export credits and of tied aid credits. We welcome
the initiative of the OECD in studying export credit premium systems
and structures and look forward to an early report.
Energy
17. As the Gulf crisis showed, the supply and price of oil remain vul-
nerable to political shocks, which disturb the world economy. But
these shocks have been contained by the effective operation of the
market, by the welcome increase in supplies by certain oil-exporting
countries and by the actions co-ordinated by the International Energy
Agency (IEA), particularly the use of stocks. We are committed to
strengthen the IEA's emergency preparedness and its supporting
measures. Since the crisis has led to improved relations between pro-
ducers and consumers, contacts among all market participants could
be further developed to promote communication, transparency and
the efficient working of market forces.
18. We will work to secure stable worldwide energy supplies, to re-
move barriers to energy trade and investment, to encourage high envi-
ronmental and safety standards and to promote international
cooperation on research and development in all these areas. We will
also seek to improve energy efficiency and to price energy from all
sources so as to reflect costs fully, including environmental costs.
19. In this context, nuclear power generation contributes to diversi-
fying energy sources and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In devel-
oping nuclear power as an economic energy source, it is essential to
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achieve and maintain the highest available standards of safety, includ-
ing in waste management, and to encourage cooperation to this end
throughout the world. The safety situation in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union deserves particular attention. This is an
urgent problem and we call upon the international community to de-
velop an effective means of coordinating its response.
20. The commercial development of renewable energy sources and
their integration with general energy systems should also be en-
couraged, because of the advantages these sources offer for environ-
mental protection and energy security.
21. We all intend to take a full part in the initiative of the European
Community for the establishment of a European Energy Charter on
the basis of equal rights and obligations of signatory countries. The
aid is to promote free and undistorted energy trade, to enhance secur-
ity of supply, to protect the environment and to assist economic re-
form in Central and East European countries and the Soviet Union,
especially by creating an open, non-discriminatory regime for com-
mercial energy investment.
